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POSTHUMOUSLY CONCEIVED CHILDREN 
AND THEIR SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS 
BASED ON STATE INTESTACY LAW:  
HOW ASTRUE v. CAPATO CHANGES  
FUTURE SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS 
AS TECHNOLOGY ADVANCES 
Catherine Kim* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A widowed spouse may have a variety of reasons why she wants 
to conceive after her spouse’s death.1 A widow can turn to in vitro 
fertilization to make “a tribute to one’s deceased partner . . . [, to 
follow] religious reasons . . . [,] to know the genetic origin of one’s 
child . . . [, to] produce a full sibling rather than a half 
sibling . . . [, or] to create a grandchild.”2 However, a recent U.S. 
Supreme Court case may impact their decision to do so. Before 
Astrue v. Capato,3 courts inconsistently addressed the issue of Social 
Security benefits for posthumously conceived children under the 
United States Social Security Act (the “Act”).4 The Act states that 
 
 * J.D. Candidate 2014, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Psychology, May 2009, 
University of Southern California. I want to thank Professor Jan Costello for her encouragement 
and guidance in writing this Comment. I would also like to thank Laura Riley at the Cancer Legal 
Resource Center for her invaluable feedback. A big thank you to the editors and staffers of the 
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, especially Lydia Lee, Mark Gray, and David Rosenberg. 
Finally, I want to thank my family and friends for all their support. 
 1. Benjamin C. Carpenter, A Chip Off the Old Iceblock: How Cryopreservation Has 
Changed Estate Law, Why Attempts to Address the Issue Have Fallen Short, and How to Fix It, 
21 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 347, 358 (2011). 
 2. Kristine S. Knaplund, Legal Issues of Maternity and Inheritance for the Biotech Child of 
the 21st Century, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 393, 398–99 (2008). 
 3. 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012). 
 4. Compare Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that a posthumously 
conceived child was not a “child” within the meaning of the Social Security Act), Finley v. 
Astrue, 601 F. Supp. 2d 1092 (E.D. Ark. 2009) (finding that denying Social Security benefits to a 
posthumously conceived child did not violate equal protection), and Woodward v. Comm’r of 
Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002) (holding that in Massachusetts posthumously conceived 
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families of deceased workers are entitled to Social Security benefits.5 
Some courts ruled in favor of allowing benefits for posthumously 
conceived children,6 while others denied such benefits.7 In addition, 
the emergence and increasing use of in vitro fertilization and other 
assisted reproduction methods have exacerbated the problem of 
determining a child’s legal parentage,8 especially when wills omit 
posthumously conceived children.9 Courts have, at times, struggled 
with deciding whether these children qualified under their deceased 
parent’s benefits when there was no consent to or mentioning of 
posthumously conceived children under the decedent’s written will 
or addendum.10 
On May 21, 2012, the Supreme Court finally addressed this 
ambiguous issue in Capato and held that posthumously conceived 
children are not entitled to Social Security benefits if a state’s 
intestacy law does not allow it.11 Instead of following the Supremacy 
Clause’s potential to or ability to “creat[e] a uniform federal rule,” 
the Court surprisingly deferred to state intestacy law.12 This, 
however, created the potential for unequal application of federal 
Social Security law to violate a citizen’s due process rights.13 
Therefore, to address the potentially great variation in outcomes 
based on differing state intestacy laws, the states should adopt the 
Uniform Parentage Act.14 
This Comment examines and analyzes the Court’s holding in 
Capato. Part II of this Comment provides an overview of how 
 
children are considered a decedent’s “issue” only when a genetic relationship is demonstrated, 
and consent to posthumous conception and support was given), with Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 
371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that posthumously conceived children are “children” for 
purposes of the Act). 
 5. U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, SSA PUBLICATION NO. 05-10084, 
SURVIVORS BENEFITS 4 (2012), available at www.ssa.gov/pubs/10084.pdf [hereinafter SSA 
BENEFITS]. 
 6. See Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 599. 
 7. See Beeler, 651 F.3d at 965–66; Finley, 601 F. Supp. 2d at 1103, 1106; Woodward, 760 
N.E.2d at 272. 
 8. Knaplund, supra note 2, at 393. 
 9. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 360. 
 10. See id. at 418–22. 
 11. Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2034 (2012). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 2033. 
 14. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (amended 2002), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/ 
shared/docs/parentage/upa_final_2002.pdf.  
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Capato came before the Supreme Court. Part III discusses the 
historical background of Social Security benefits. Part IV explains 
how the Court reached its conclusion despite fluctuating precedent. 
Part V addresses why the Court’s holding was correct but could 
potentially have some negative implications because the outcome of 
a case can vary greatly depending on which state statute applies. It 
also examines the Uniform Parentage Act as the proper solution to 
cure the defects in Capato. Lastly, Part VI illustrates how the Capato 
case affects future Social Security benefits cases by reflecting on the 
rapid growth of assisted reproduction technology. 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A.  Facts 
Capato arose after Karen Capato was denied Social Security 
benefits for her twins conceived through in vitro fertilization after the 
death of her husband, Robert Capato.15 The Capatos had preserved 
Robert’s sperm after he was diagnosed with esophageal cancer 
because the couple wanted more children and his prescribed 
chemotherapy treatment would likely have rendered him sterile.16 In 
the event Robert became sterile, the couple intended to conceive 
using in vitro fertilization; however, they were unable to do so before 
his untimely death.17 Eighteen months after his death, Karen used in 
vitro fertilization to conceive the twins whose benefits were at issue 
in this case.18 Because Robert died in Florida, the administrative law 
judge and district court applied Florida state intestacy law to examine 
the issue.19 
B.  Procedural History 
When Karen Capato brought her insurance benefits claim to an 
administrative law judge, her request was denied. The judge 
reasoned that because the case was related to “medical-scientific 
 
 15. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2025–26. 
 16. Id. at 2026. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Capato v. Astrue, No. 08-5405 (DMC), 2010 WL 1076522, at *6 (D. N.J. Mar. 23, 
2010), aff’d in part and vacated in part, Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 631 
F.3d 626 (3d Cir. 2011), rev’d, Astrue v. Capato, 132 S.Ct. 2021 (2012). 
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technology [that] ha[d] advanced faster than the regulatory 
process . . . [he] believed himself constrained by applicable laws and 
regulations to find disentitlement.”20 
A District Court of New Jersey affirmed on the grounds that 
“the twins would qualify for benefits only if, as 42 U.S.C. 
§ 416(h)(2)(A) specifies, they could inherit from the deceased wage 
earner under state intestacy law.”21 Because Robert had been 
domiciled in Florida, state law specified that “posthumously 
conceived children do not qualify for inheritance through intestate 
succession.”22 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s 
opinion by defining “child” under 42 U.S.C. § 416(e).23  Through its 
interpretation, the Third Circuit determined that the twins were 
“undisputed biological children of [the] deceased wage 
earner . . . [, and] his children were dependent or deemed dependent 
on [their father].”24 
The Commissioner of Social Security, Michael Astrue, 
petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to determine whether the Capato 
twins fell within the definition of “child[ren]” under § 416 of the 
Act.25 
III.  HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK 
Capato addressed an ambiguity in the Act regarding the 
distribution of survivor benefits. The Act states that families of 
deceased workers are entitled to Social Security benefits.26 As an 
employee works and pays Social Security taxes, he or she earns 
credits toward Social Security benefits, which the surviving 
immediate family members can receive.27 Benefits cover children 
under age eighteen and can include stepchildren, grandchildren, step-
 
 20. Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 628 (3d Cir. 2011), rev’d, 
Astrue v. Capato, 132 S.Ct. 2021 (2012) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 21. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2026. Title 42 of the United States Code Service defines “The 
Public Health and Welfare.” 42 U.S.C. § 416 specifies additional definitions of the Social 
Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 416 (2006). 
 22. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2026. 
 23. Id. at 2027. 
 24. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 631 F.3d at 632. 
 25. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2027. 
 26. SSA BENEFITS, supra note 5. 
 27. Id. 
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grandchildren, and adopted children.28 Before Capato, the courts had 
been divided in their interpretations of the Act by allowing some 
potential beneficiaries to collect benefits, but not others.29 Now, 
courts are free to interpret eligibility based on state intestacy law.30 
IV.  REASONING OF THE COURT 
Justice Ginsburg authored the unanimous opinion in Capato.31 
The opinion reiterated that under the Act, biological children are 
entitled to benefits “only if they qualify for inheritance from the 
decedent under state intestacy law, or satisfy one of the statutory 
alternatives to the requirement.”32 Since the statute was written in 
1939, “[t]he technology that made the twins’ conception and birth 
possible, it is safe to say, was not contemplated by Congress when 
the relevant provisions of [the Act] originated (1939) or were 
amended to read as they now do (1965).”33 
With the statute in mind, the Supreme Court considered a 
variety of issues that Capato presented to determine whether the 
twins were entitled to benefits: (1) what factors should be used to 
determine the definition of “child”; (2) how was state intestacy law 




 28. Id. 
 29. Compare Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2011) (concluding that a child 
posthumously conceived through artificial insemination was not eligible for benefits because her 
father’s deathbed statement and signature agreeing to accept and acknowledge paternity did not 
satisfy the paternity acknowledgment requirement under the Act’s provision allowing a child to 
be deemed a natural child); Finley v. Astrue, 601 F. Supp. 2d 1092 (E.D. Ark. 2009) (reviewing 
the constitutionality of the Social Security Commissioner’s decision denying claims for benefits 
because although the child was created as an embryo during the time of the child’s parents’ 
marriage, the embryo was not implanted in the mother’s womb until after the father’s death), and 
Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002) (establishing eligibility if 
genetic relationship with the decedent is proven and decedent consented both to reproduce 
posthumously and support any resulting child), with Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593 
(9th Cir. 2004) (holding that posthumously conceived children were children within the Act’s 
definition because the deceased father was the biological father and married to the children’s 
mother). 
 30. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2034. 
 31. Id. at 2025. 
 32. Id. at 2026. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 2027–34. 
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A.  The Definition of “Child” 
While the Third Circuit found it unnecessary to analyze § 416(h) 
because the twins were undeniably Robert Capato’s biological 
children, the Supreme Court found a major flaw in the Third 
Circuit’s reasoning.35 
The Third Circuit determined that § 416(h) would be applied 
when a child’s family status needed to be determined and § 416(e) 
when the claimant was the biological child of a married couple.36 
However, the Supreme Court pointed out different variations of what 
would qualify under the definition of “child” and determined that 
marriage does not “always make the parentage of a child certain, nor 
does the absence of marriage necessarily mean that a child’s 
parentage is uncertain.”37 “Under Florida law, a marriage ends upon 
the death of a spouse,” so, because the Capato twins were conceived 
posthumously, they “would not qualify as ‘marital’ children.”38 On 
the other hand, the Act qualifies an offspring for insurance benefits 
as a “natural child” if he or she meets any of the following four 
criteria: 
(1) the applicant could inherit the insured’s personal 
property as his or her natural child under State inheritance 
laws; (2) the applicant is the insured’s natural child and [his 
or her parents] went through a ceremony which would have 
resulted in a valid marriage between them except for a legal 
impediment; (3) before death, the insured acknowledged in 
writing his or her parentage of the applicant, was decreed 
by a court to be the applicant’s parent, or was ordered by a 
court to contribute to the applicant’s support; or (4) other 
evidence shows that the insured is the applicant’s natural 
father or mother and was either living with, or contributing 
to the support of, the applicant.39 
 
 35. Id. at 2029; Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 631 (3d Cir. 
2011), rev’d, Astrue v. Capato, 132 S.Ct. 2021 (2012). 
 36. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2029. 
 37. Id. at 2030. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 2028–29 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.355(a) (2006)). 
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However, the Supreme Court did not “invoke any of the 
alternative criteria as a basis for the twins’ ‘child’ status.”40 Using 
state law to determine a child’s status “is anything but anomalous” 
because “[t]he Act commonly refers to state law on matters of family 
status.”41 
Ultimately, the Court concluded that the Social Security 
Administration’s definition of “child” under § 416(e) must be 
interpreted in light of § 416(h).42 When Congress allows an agency, 
such as the Social Security Administration, to hold policy-making 
responsibilities, it is reasonable to defer to the agency’s interpretation 
of its own statutes and regulations.43 Thus, the Social Security 
Administration’s interpretation was a reasonable interpretation and 
entitled to deference.44 
B.  State Intestacy Law 
In addition, the Court determined the Capato twins’ eligibility to 
receive Social Security benefits by looking at the deceased parent’s 
domicile state’s intestacy law.45 The Supreme Court addressed the 
issue of how the Act applied state law for intestacy limitations.46 This 
included “duration-of-relationship limitations,”47 under which a 
parent-child relationship must exist for a certain amount of time 
before the insured’s death.48 The Supreme Court also discussed 
various states’ “time limits,” which range from several months to 
years, and allowed states to “treat[] a posthumously conceived child 
as in gestation at the individual’s death, but only if specified time 
limits are met.”49 The Supreme Court, however, stated that the Act’s 
purpose was not to “generally benefit[] needy persons” but to 
“provide . . . dependent members of [a wage earner’s] family with 
protection against the hardship occasioned by [the] loss of [the 
 
 40. Id. at 2028. 
 41. Id. at 2031. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 2033–34 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001)). 
 44. Id. at 2033. 
 45. Id. at 2026. 
 46. Id. at 2031. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 2031–32. 
 49. Id. at 2032 (quoting UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(k) (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 58 
(Supp. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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insured’s] earnings.”50 The Court recognized that the Act’s 
“refer[ence] to state law to determine the status of a posthumously 
conceived child[,] . . . adhered to without deviation for many 
decades, is at least reasonable.”51 Justice Ginsburg’s opinion 
complimented the Act for “employing eligibility to inherit under 
state intestacy law as a workable substitute for burdensome case-by-
case determinations whether the child was, in fact, dependent on her 
father’s earnings.”52 However, since the Act will still be applied on a 
disorderly state-by-state basis, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion delved 
nicely into the need for something more uniform.53 Therefore, as 
discussed below, the Court should have taken a further step in 
interpreting the Act. 
C.  Due Process Clause 
Additionally, the Capato Court addressed Karen Capato’s 
constitutional concerns, especially the need for a higher level of 
scrutiny.54 The Court agreed that the “serious constitutional concerns 
under the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause” 
were easily met under the rational basis test.55 Karen Capato had 
argued that the Social Security Administration’s interpretation of the 
Act treated posthumously conceived children “as an inferior subset 
of natural children who are ineligible for government benefits simply 
because of their date of birth and method of conception.”56 The Court 
dismissed the argument because Congress had emphasized that 
“[reserving] benefits [for] those children who have lost a parent’s 
support, and . . . using reasonable presumptions to minimize the 
administrative burden of proving dependency on a case-by-case 
basis.”57 
 
 50. Id. at 2032 (citing Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 52 (1977)). 
 51. Id. at 2033. 
 52. Id. at 2032. 
 53. Brief of Amicus Curiae Cancer Legal Resource Center of the Disability Rights Legal 
Center as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 10, Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021 (No. 11-159), 
2012 WL 392545, at *10. 
 54. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2033. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. (citing Brief for Respondent at 42–43, Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021 (No. 11-159), 2012 
WL 273128, at *42–43). 
 57. Id. (quoting Vernoff v. Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2009) (alterations in 
original)). 
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The opinion concluded that the Act was a viable “resolution of 
Karen Capato’s application for child’s insurance benefits by 
reference to state intestacy law.”58 The focus on state intestacy law in 
the Act thus relieves courts from having to scrutinize on a case-by-
case basis.59 
V.  ANALYSIS 
The Capato Court was correct to deny the twins Social Security 
benefits based on their father’s earned income. The Act parallels the 
state interests and benefits family members most affected by a death, 
meaning those that are alive or in gestation at the time of death.60 
The Supreme Court justified its reasoning by viewing the Act’s 
interpretation to be “at least reasonable.”61 
A.  Improper Reasons to Conceive Posthumously 
The Court ruled correctly because putting restrictions on Social 
Security benefits would limit improper reasons to posthumously 
conceive. The government implemented survivor benefits to protect 
and support family members already depending on the deceased 
wage earner’s income while he or she was alive.62 First, it was 
important to limit the government’s liability of Social Security 
benefits by creating a clear cutoff for Social Security beneficiaries.63 
Surely, there is a policy argument that people may abuse the system 
for improper reasons, and the government still may have to pay 
based on state intestacy law. Because there are so many variations of 
 
 58. Id. at 2034. 
 59. Id. at 2032. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 2033. 
 62. SSA BENEFITS, supra note 5. 
 63.  
Since 1939, the Social Security Act has provided ‘survivor benefits’ to replace the 
economic support a family loses after a parental death . . . if the worker’s spouse 
provides primary care for an eligible child, the spouse may also receive monthly 
benefits until that child reaches age sixteen or is no longer disabled. The amount 
payable to a survivor equals 75% of the decedent’s primary insurance amount, 
which is the monthly benefit amount that would have been payable to the worker 
upon initial entitlement at full retirement age. However, a family maximum 
provision limits the total benefits to a family to between 150% and 188% of the 
worker’s primary insurance amount. This can be a great benefit to a family.  
Carpenter, supra note 1, at 384. 
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state intestacy law, the Court should have provided a clearer 
definition of “child” and utilized this definition as a limiting 
principle to cut off Social Security benefits. However, since the 
Court failed to do so in Capato, the states should implement the 
Uniform Parentage Act so that the definition of “child” would be 
standardized across the states. Alternatively, the Court should 
federalize a definition of “child” pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.64 
Second, the Court made the right decision because encouraging 
widowed parents to posthumously conceive for incentives, such as 
financial gain, would be immoral. Receiving Social Security benefits 
“without the deceased spouse’s consent is unethical and may violate 
a right to . . . procreative liberty. Even if no such rights exist, the 
practice should be discouraged on public policy grounds.”65 
Consequently, rather than allowing posthumously conceived children 
to receive benefits easily, the Court made the right decision to follow 
state intestacy law. 
B.  Constitutional Concerns 
The Court determined that the Due Process Clause had not been 
violated because Congress’s regime for determining the status of 
posthumously conceived children met the rational basis test.66 The 
U.S. Constitution asserts that the federal and state governments may 
not deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law.67 The state may deprive a person of life, liberty, or 
property, but it must do so by due process of law.68 There are two 
kinds of due process: substantive due process and procedural due 
 
 64. Kristine S. Knaplund, Children of Assisted Reproduction, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM  
899, 935 (2012). 
 65. Id. at 922. 
 66. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2033; Rational Basis Test, LEGAL INFO. INST. CORNELL U. LAW 
SCH. (Aug. 19, 2010, 5:23 PM), http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/rational_basis_test (“Under the 
rational basis test, the courts will uphold a law if it is rationally related to a legitimate government 
purpose. The challenger of the constitutionality of the statute has the burden of proving that there 
is no conceivable legitimate purpose or that the law is not rationally related to it. This test is the 
most deferential of the three levels of review in due process or equal protection analysis (the other 
two levels being intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny), and it requires only a minimum level 
of judicial scrutiny.”).  
 67. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 68. See id. amend. V;  id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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process.69 The Capato Court analyzed substantive due process to 
determine whether the government interest was important enough to 
justify the deprivation, and whether Congress’s regime was 
sufficiently linked to that interest.70 When determining whether the 
Capato twins’ due process rights had been violated, the Court 
decided that Social Security benefits fall under property rights, which 
include entitlements.71 Here, the federal government passed and 
enforced the Act, which paralleled state action.72 Since there was a 
deprivation of property, the government had to satisfy due process.73 
The Court then applied the rational basis test to determine 
whether the Act interpretation violated substantive due process.74 
The government’s interest was legitimate because the Act was 
intended to provide benefits to the dependents most likely to be 
adversely affected by the death of a benefit-receiving parent.75 The 
means to achieve this interest, by following state intestacy law 
eligibility, was not the only possible approach; however, it was a 
reasonable approach that was not arbitrary.76 Therefore, the Act’s 
interpretation and application satisfied due process. 
In contrast, the Court could potentially have interpreted the Act 
as unconstitutional. For example, a longer time period or broader 
eligibility standard could encourage and help widowed spouses 
exercise their fundamental constitutional right to have children.77 
Other constitutional concerns include “discrimination against 
children (who have no control over the timing and method of their 
conception and birth), their siblings, and their surviving parents.”78 
These issues illustrate that there was a fundamental right at stake, so 
 
 69. Peter Strauss, Due Process, LEGAL INFO. INST. CORNELL U. LAW SCH., 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/due_process. 
 70. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 546 (3d ed. 
2006) (“Substantive due process looks to whether there is a sufficient justification for the 
government’s action.”). 
 71. Strauss, supra note 69. 
 72. Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2025 (2012). 
 73. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 70, at 549. 
 74. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2033. 
 75. Id. at 2032–33. 
 76. Id. at 2033–34. 
 77. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 70, at 546. 
 78. Brief of Amicus Curiae Cancer Legal Resource Center of the Disability Rights Legal 
Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 53, at 14. 
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the Supreme Court should have applied strict scrutiny.79 However, 
the Supreme Court dismissed this argument by stating that the case 
involved a property right or entitlement, which circumvented the 
need to address the fundamental rights issue.80 Therefore, the Act’s 
definition and interpretation are constitutional because the Court 
deferred to state law. 
C.  How the Court’s Reasoning May Lead to Negative Implications 
There are, however, several unintended consequences of the 
Capato decision, such as unequal application of the Act based on 
differing state intestacy laws. The outcome of a case can vary greatly 
depending on where the plaintiff is domiciled.  
The Capato case would have been decided differently if the 
court had applied New Jersey law instead of Florida law. Although 
the trial court determined that Robert Capato was domiciled in 
Florida and thus used Florida state law to determine the twins’ Social 
Security benefit qualifications, many of the factors considered show 
why New Jersey law should have been applied.81 First, the Capatos 
lived in Florida as newlyweds, but they had married in New Jersey.82 
In addition, Karen Capato stated that “their final destination was 
going to be New Jersey . . . to try to open businesses there.”83 Robert 
Capato had “attempted to incorporate a business in New Jersey to 
start opening health clubs there so that, ultimately, the family could 
move there.”84 He stayed in Florida to receive his radiation and 
chemotherapy treatments, but he even told others of his intent to 
move to New Jersey.85 Even after his death, Karen received artificial 
insemination treatments in New Jersey.86 
 
 79. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 70, at 546. 
 80. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2033–34. 
 81. Id. at 2026. 
 82. Capato v. Astrue, No. 08-5406, 2010 WL 1076522, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2010) , aff’d 
in part and vacated in part, Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626 (3d Cir. 
2011), rev’d, Astrue v. Capato, 132 S.Ct. 2021 (2012). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at *2. 
 86. Id. at *3. 
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The Capato twins would have benefitted from Social Security 
benefits under New Jersey intestacy law, which has a separate statute 
for omitted children in wills.87 The statute reads: 
[I]f a testator fails to provide in his will for any of his 
children born or adopted after the execution of his will, the 
omitted after-born or after-adopted child receives a share in 
the estate as follows; . . . (2) If the testator had one or more 
children living when he executed the will, and the will 
devised property or an interest in property to one or more of 
the then-living children, an omitted after-born or after-
adopted child is entitled to share in the testator’s estate.88 
Robert Capato’s will included the son he had with Karen Capato 
during his life, as well as two children from a previous marriage.89 
Since his will devised property or interests in property to his then-
living children,90 applying the New Jersey statute to the omitted 
after-born twins would entitle them to a share in Robert’s estate. 
Furthermore, Robert could have purposefully excluded “passing 
intestate succession” through the following New Jersey provision: “I 
have intentionally made no provision in this will for any future 
children who might be born to or adopted by me and my present 
spouse or any future spouse, other than as otherwise specifically 
provided in this will.”91 The Drafter’s Notes state that this “statement 
should include posthumous after-born, or after-adopted children, to 
eliminate the possibility that any such child will be treated as a 
pretermitted heir.”92 Therefore, since Robert’s will contained no 
specific provision to block intestate succession, New Jersey law 
could ultimately have entitled the twins to Social Security benefits.93 
Other states, such as Georgia, Idaho, Minnesota, South Carolina, 
and South Dakota, have purposely excluded posthumously conceived 
children to prevent them from inheriting from their deceased parents’ 
estates.94 Surprisingly, Florida was the first state to recognize 
 
 87. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:5-16 (West 2005). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2026 (2012). 
 90. Id. 
 91. 10A N.J. Forms Legal & Bus. § 24:274 (2012). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2026. 
 94. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 378. 
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posthumously conceived children in probate court “if the decedent 
provided for the child in the decedent’s will.”95 Thus, Capato 
changes the outcome of cases in these states because they will be 
determined on a state-by-state basis. 
The good news is that “[c]ourt records show only about 100 
other federal benefit applicants in a similar situation as Capato.”96 
However, the definition of “a ‘child’ in relation to a parent and 
whether current state and federal law [is] flexible enough to 
incorporate a growing range of technological conception 
possibilities” was left unanswered.97 
D.  Future Amendment of the Law 
Although there is not a tremendous number of posthumously 
conceived children applying for Social Security benefits, the number 
of families using artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, 
cryopreservation, and surrogacy is increasing as technology 
advances.98 The law must adapt to these changes for the future. 
Because the Court did not specifically define “child,” similar cases 
may soon appear seeking a clearer definition of “child.” 
Furthermore, if the Third Circuit’s proposed broad interpretation 
of “child” had been used, it would treat all biological and genetic 
children equally.99 This presents further constitutional concerns of 
“discrimination against children (who have no control over the 
timing and method of their conception and birth), their siblings, and 
their surviving parents (who did nothing more objectionable than 
exercise their fundamental right to procreate).”100 Parental rights 
should come at the time when the parents decided to procreate rather 
than “at the moment of childbirth or even pregnancy.”101 Therefore, 
“when a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which a 
serious doubt of constitutionality may be avoided, a court should 
 
 95. Id. at 379–80. 
 96. Bill Mears, Justices Deny Benefits for Child Conceived After Death of Parent, CNN 
(May 21, 2012, 5:00 PM), http://articles.cnn.com/2012-05-21/justice/justice_scotus-posthumous-
conception-ruling_1_survivors-benefits-children-justices?_s=PM:JUSTICE. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 357. 
 99. Brief of Amicus Curiae Cancer Legal Resource Center of the Disability Rights Legal 
Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 53, at 11. 
 100. Id. at 14 (citation omitted). 
 101. Id. at 15 (citing In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)). 
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adopt that construction.”102 The Capatos determined that they wanted 
to freeze Robert’s sperm prior to chemotherapy,103 and this showed 
their decision to have children in the future. 
However, it should also be considered that full siblings, 
including then-living children and posthumously conceived children, 
would be treated differently.104 Even though Social Security benefits 
are meant for children who had relied on the deceased parent for 
support, this could cause other complications, such as the widowed 
spouse receiving fewer benefits for the surviving family if the 
surviving family includes posthumously conceived children.105 There 
simply would be no predictability or finality in the law. The Court 
ultimately rejected the Third Circuit’s broad interpretation of “child,” 
not because of its unreasonable interpretation, but because the Social 
Security Administration’s proposed interpretation was more 
consistent with the purpose of the Act.106 
E.  Possible Bright-Line Rule 
Moreover, some states have a broader definition of the Act.107 
An ideal legal framework to compare to would be the Uniform 
Parentage Act108 because it only recognizes posthumously conceived 
children if the deceased parent indicated, in writing, the intent to 
have posthumous children and recognize them as heirs.109 Although 
some criticize that the Uniform Parentage Act is too narrowly 
construed,110 it is a simpler way of controlling the issue and provides 
much needed uniformity in the law. There are other frameworks, 
such as the Uniform Probate Act, that broadly define the issue;111 
however, when a state does not “address the status of posthumously 
 
 102. Id. at 10 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 
693 (1979)). 
 103. Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2026 (2012). 
 104. Brief for National Senior Citizens Law Center and National Organization of Social 
Security Claimants’ Representatives as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 14, Capato, 
132 S. Ct. 2021 (No. 11-159), 2012 WL 416747, at *14. 
 105. See Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021. 
 106. Id. at 2034. 
 107. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 368. 
 108. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707 (amended 2002). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Knaplund, supra note 64, at 919. 
 111. Id. 
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conceived children in its probate code, a court may look to the 
[Uniform Parentage Act] to determine the parties’ relationship.”112 
To address the potentially great variation in outcomes based on 
differing state laws, the states should adopt the Uniform Parentage 
Act. During oral argument, Karen Capato’s attorney referenced a 
preemptive federal rule that “a child born four years after her father’s 
death would be eligible for benefits.”113 In a cryopreservation and 
estate law article, Professor Benjamin Carpenter noted that, because 
the issue of posthumously conceived children and Social Security 
benefits is still a fairly new concept, 
[t]hirty-three states, plus the District of Columbia, still have 
not addressed whether a posthumously conceived child has 
any interest in the deceased parent’s estate, or whether such 
a child can be included as child, issue, heir, descendant, or 
similar term under a class-gift provision in a will, trust 
agreement, or other governing instrument.114 
Therefore, the Uniform Parentage Act suggests that if a spouse 
dies “before placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos, the deceased 
spouse is not a parent of the resulting child unless the deceased 
spouse consented in a record that, if assisted reproduction were to 
occur after death, the deceased spouse would be a parent of the 
child.”115 Since the Act is outdated, a uniform rule should be adopted 
because “[d]eveloping reproductive technology has outpaced federal 
and state laws, which currently do not address directly the legal 
issues created by posthumous conception.”116 A uniform definition 
of “child,” such as the one used in the Uniform Parentage Act, would 
solve the inequity created by differing state intestacy laws and would 
provide finality to the families affected.117 Although the Court 
referred to state intestacy laws as a way of avoiding case-by-case 
situations,118 states should take another step forward by 
implementing a uniform statute. 
 
 112. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 369. 
 113. Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2032 (2012) (citation omitted). 
 114. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 401. 
 115. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707 (amended 2002). 
 116. Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 117. See Carpenter, supra note 1, at 350–51. 
 118. Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2032 (2012). 
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In Capato, the outcome would have differed depending on 
whether Florida or New Jersey intestacy laws applied. However, if 
the Uniform Parentage Act is used in all Social Security benefits 
cases for posthumously conceived children, the outcome would be 
predictable and equal for similar cases. The Capato twins would still 
be ineligible for Social Security benefits under both the Uniform 
Parentage Act and the Uniform Probate Act because there was no 
written statement of intent by the deceased father.119 However, even 
if the Capato twins did not win this particular case, the Uniform 
Parentage Act would still be a better method to determine which 
children would receive benefits because it provides a clearer answer 
for future cases. As a result, there would be fewer complications in 
determining benefits and distinguishing various factors, such as 
whether the deceased had wanted children before his death and 
whether his place of domicile mattered, because they would all fall 
within the bright-line rule. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Capato Court’s holding will impact future Social Security 
cases and add an unnecessary factor for a widowed spouse to 
consider when deciding whether to conceive after his or her spouse’s 
death.120 The Court interpreted the Act to provide a clearer 
framework to prevent people from taking advantage of the benefits 
intended for family members whose need was anticipated at the time 
of the wage-earner’s death.121 For the time being, the ruling correctly 
addressed constitutional concerns and ensured that the Act’s 
interpretation was “at least reasonable.”122 However, state 
legislatures should modify and update state intestacy law to include 
the Uniform Parentage Act’s definition of “child” so that our legal 
system can move forward alongside the rapid growth of assisted 
reproduction technology. Capato answered many important 
questions but failed to address others. Without such a universal 
adjustment, cases will come to court to readdress the definition of 
“child.” Full biological siblings, born before and after the death of 
 
 119. Id. at 2026. 
 120. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 358. 
 121. See Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2032. 
 122. Id. at 2033. 
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the decedent parent, may be treated unequally and discriminated 
against solely based on the timing of their births.123 In order to 
address these issues, either states should adopt the Uniform 
Parentage Act’s definition of “child,” or Congress should adopt such 




 123. Brief of National Senior Citizens Law Center and National Organization of Social 
Security Claimants’ Representatives as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, supra note 104, 
at 14. 
 124. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2034. 
